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Cross-Country Evidence on the Role of Independent Media in Constraining  
Corporate Tax Aggressiveness 
 
Abstract 
 
Using an international sample of firms from 32 countries, we study the relation between 
media independence and corporate tax aggressiveness. We measure media independence by 
the extent of private ownership and competition in the media industry. Using an indicator 
variable for tax aggressiveness when the firm’s corporate tax avoidance measure is within the 
top quartile of each country-industry combination, we find strong evidence that media 
independence is associated with a lower likelihood of tax aggressiveness, after controlling for 
other institutional determinants, including home-country tax system characteristics. We also 
find that the effect of media independence is more pronounced when the legal environment is 
weaker, and when the information environment is less transparent.  
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Cross-Country Evidence on the Role of Independent Media in Constraining  
Corporate Tax Aggressiveness 
 
1. Introduction 
The media have recently reported many incidences of corporate tax avoidance, a highly 
controversial practice, by firms around the world.1 This focus on corporate tax avoidance is 
not confined only to developed economies, but is also prevalent in emerging economies.2 
Anecdotal evidence indicates that media exposure of corporate tax avoidance activities can 
lead to firms being pressured to pay additional taxes. For example, in a widely-publicized 
case in 2013, Starbucks voluntarily paid £10 million in corporate income taxes to the U.K. 
government in response to a public backlash from media reports of tax avoidance and 
subsequent investigation by members of the U.K. Parliament.3 Such media exposure of tax 
avoidance and associated efforts to “shame” these practices can act as a deterrent for 
corporate tax avoidance, beyond legal institutions such as tax enforcement. Given the 
prevalence of corporate tax avoidance and the anecdotal evidence on the media’s role in 
curtailing such behavior, we study the effects of media independence on corporate tax 
aggressiveness for a sample of firms from 32 countries around the world.4  
According to World Bank Institute (2002), “as important providers of information, the 
media are more likely to promote better economic performance when they are more likely to 
                                                 
1 These include but are not limited to editorials in leading news outlets such as Bloomberg’s “The Great 
Corporate Tax Dodge,” the New York Times’ “But Nobody Pays That,” The Times’ “Secrets of Tax Avoiders,” 
and the Guardian’s “Tax Gap.”   
2 For example, a recent report by Confederation of Indian Industry (CII) and global services firm Ernst & Young 
(EY) indicates that countries like India and China are looking at tax base erosion. 
3 A Starbucks spokesperson said “We listened to our customers in December and so decided to forgo certain 
deductions which would make us liable to pay £10m in corporation tax this year and a further £10m in 2014 
(emphasis added),” which suggests that Starbucks was not convicted of any tax wrongdoing but voluntarily paid 
additional taxes. Interestingly, this was Starbucks’ first tax payment in five years, since 2009. 
4 In this paper, we follow Hanlon and Heitzman (2010) and define tax avoidance broadly as the reduction in 
explicit taxes paid. Hanlon and Heitzman (2010) state that “if tax avoidance represents a continuum of tax 
planning strategies where something like municipal bond investments are at one end (lower explicit tax, 
perfectly legal), then terms such as “noncompliance,” “evasion,” “aggressiveness,” and “sheltering” would be 
closer to the other end of the continuum. Therefore, we define tax aggressiveness as tax planning strategies at 
the more aggressive end of the tax avoidance spectrum that are more likely to push the envelope of tax law, and 
to include the more aggressive tax-related activities that the media presumably are more concerned about in 
their coverage. 
3 
 
satisfy three conditions: the media are independent, the media provide good-quality 
information, and the media have a broad reach.” Following this World Bank Institute report, 
our main focus is on the effects of the independent media on corporate tax aggressiveness. 
We reason that an independent media, where journalists have incentives to investigate and 
uncover stories on wrongdoing, is better able to monitor corporate tax aggressiveness. 
Following prior literature (Djankov et al. 2003; Gentzkow and Shapiro 2006; Houston et al. 
2011), we measure media independence as the extent of private ownership and competition in 
the media industry. Djankov et al. (2003) note that the media are less likely to deliver 
complete and unbiased news when they are more tightly controlled by the government.5 
Another important factor that influences the media’s effectiveness at monitoring and 
reporting independently is competition. Djankov et al. (2003) indicate that higher levels of 
competition facilitate the reporting of unbiased and accurate information. Gentzkow and 
Shapiro (2006) argue that in a competitive environment, media firms have stronger incentives 
to identify and report on issues of interest and “newsworthy events” in order to differentiate 
themselves from their competitors, and thus to increase their revenues.  
We argue that corporate tax aggressiveness is one such “newsworthy event” that 
independent media firms can use to achieve differentiation and thus have incentives to report 
on.6 While corporate tax avoidance produces substantial tax savings that are beneficial to the 
firm’s shareholders and senior management,7 tax avoidance is generally considered as 
exploiting the complexities, technicalities and loopholes in the tax laws (Dowling 2014). 
                                                 
5 Although state owned media may have higher incentives to expose tax avoidance practices, prior literature 
shows that state ownership of media is associated with higher corruption, thus reducing or completely reversing 
these incentives (Houston et al. 2011).  
6 Within two days of announcement of the merger between Pfizer and Allergen, The New York Times carried an 
editorial headlined, “Pfizer’s Big Tax Avoidance Play” (The New York Times, November 24, 2015).  In it the 
editorial states, “This merger is a tax-dodging maneuver that enriches shareholders and executives while short 
changing the public and robbing the Treasury …”. This is an example of tax aggressive activities becoming 
headline grabbing newsworthy events in major media outlets.   
7 Potential savings from aggressive tax avoidance strategies can be economically large (Scholes et al. 2014). For 
example, Bloomberg News reports that Google avoided $2 billion in worldwide income taxes in 2011 by 
channeling $10 billion of revenue into a Bermuda shell company. 
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Based on social norm theory, corporate tax avoidance is not considered to be right and just 
from a general public point of view because it imposes costs on the government and society 
at-large (Elster 1989; Dowling 2014). In particular, under this view, firms are expected to pay 
their “fair share” of tax on their profits to the State.8 In essence, this view is societal in nature. 
Christensen and Murphy (2004) and Christensen (2011) argue that the payment of corporate 
tax is the area where corporate citizenship is most tangible and most important. Recent 
business ethics literature frames tax avoidance practices as negative CSR and, as such, 
socially irresponsible (Preuss 2012; Lanis and Richardson 2014). Given the potential societal 
impact and the controversial aspect of corporate tax avoidance, reporting on tax avoidance 
makes a compelling news story that independent media firms have incentives to uncover and 
monitor. 
We posit that the independent media could play an important monitoring role in 
constraining tax aggressive practices by having an impact on both the expected direct and 
indirect costs of corporate tax avoidance. In particular, the exposure of tax aggressive 
activities by the independent media can attract scrutiny from tax and regulatory authorities, 
which increases the probability of detection and enforcement, and subsequently opens the 
door for potentially large direct costs such as litigation and other costs incurred in mounting a 
defense against tax authorities, back taxes, interest, fines and penalties, and more rigorous 
scrutiny from tax authorities in the long-run (e.g., being blacklisted by the tax authorities).9  
In addition, exposure by the independent media imposes indirect costs such as 
reputational damage to the firm and its managers. In a recent study based on a survey of 
nearly 600 corporate tax executives, Graham et al. (2014) document that the potential for an 
                                                 
8 Dowling (2014) characterizes the fair share of tax as the statutory tax rate times a reasonable estimate of the 
firm’s taxable profits (that is, tax base). 
9 Anecdotal and empirical evidence indicates that the direct costs alone can be quite substantial. For example, in 
14 cases of tax sheltering, Wilson (2009) finds that the interest charges paid by firms to tax authorities amounted 
to 40% of the tax savings originally generated by the tax shelter transactions. Graham and Tucker (2006) report 
the case of GlaxoSmithKline P.L.C. in 2004, which owes the IRS $5.2 billion in back taxes and penalties related 
to a transfer pricing strategy dating back to 1989. 
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adverse effect on company reputation significantly constrains firms’ incentives to engage in 
tax planning strategies, with 69% of their survey respondents, including 72% of publicly 
traded respondents, indicating that reputation concerns are ‘important’ or ‘very important.’ 
Additionally, “risk of adverse media attention” was flagged as one of the important or very 
important factors that could restrain corporate tax avoidance activities. Graham et al. also 
document a positive association between reputational concerns and higher long-run cash 
effective tax rates and lower probabilities of engaging in tax shelters, which indicate that 
reputational concerns are associated with lower incentives for tax planning. Consistent with 
Graham et al.’s findings, other recent practitioner surveys (e.g., EY 2014; PwC 2014) also 
report that firms are significantly concerned about negative media coverage and the 
repercussions that follow, which could possibly include customer boycotts and reputational 
damage. For instance, EY (2014) documents in their survey of tax and finance executives of 
global companies that 89% of the largest companies are somewhat or significantly concerned 
about the media coverage of the taxes some companies are paying or their seemingly low 
effective tax rates.10 Hanlon and Slemrod (2009) also note that firms engaging in tax 
sheltering activities are often labeled as “poor corporate citizens.” The findings of these 
studies indicate that media coverage of tax aggressiveness can impose substantial reputational 
costs on the firm and its managers.  
On the other hand, Gallemore et al. (2014) find limited evidence of negative 
reputational consequences, such as increased executive or auditor turnover, in their 
examination of whether firms or their top executives face significant reputation costs for 
engaging in tax sheltering activities. Also, despite negative media coverage of controversial 
tax practices, many large corporations continue to avoid taxes, which suggests that negative 
                                                 
10 Supporting this notion, Austin and Wilson (2015) find evidence that firms with valuable customer brands 
engage in lower levels of tax avoidance, due to the threat of reputational damages associated with tax avoidance. 
In an experimental study, Hardeck and Hertl (2014) also document that media coverage of aggressive corporate 
tax strategies can affect corporate reputation, and consumers punish tax aggressive companies by lowering their 
willingness to pay for companies’ products.  
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media coverage may have only limited influence on corporate tax aggressiveness.11 The 
conflicting results of these prior studies indicate that whether media independence is 
associated with lower corporate tax aggressiveness is an unanswered question that calls for 
further empirical examination.   
We examine the relation between media independence and corporate tax 
aggressiveness using a large sample of 86,212 firm-year observations from 32 countries 
spanning the years 1995 to 2007. We use private media ownership and media industry 
competition as proxies for media independence. Specifically, using the information on 
private media ownership and media industry competition from Djankov et al. (2003), we 
measure the extent of private media ownership using the market share of viewership of 
private television stations, and the extent of media competition, using the aggregate market 
share of television stations and daily newspapers. 
We follow prior research (e.g., Hanlon and Heitzman 2010; Atwood et al. 2012) and 
define corporate tax avoidance broadly as the reduction in explicit taxes paid, and measure 
tax avoidance as the difference between the firm’s “unmanaged tax amount” (the home-
country statutory corporate tax rate times pre-tax earnings before exceptional items) and its 
“managed tax amount” (current taxes paid). This difference reflects how managers pursue 
strategies that reduce taxes paid. This definition is also consistent with the characterization of 
fair share of tax in Dowling (2014), where fair share is defined as the statutory rate of tax at 
the time on a reasonable estimate of the company’s taxable profit. Thus, our measure of 
corporate tax avoidance represents the deviations from the fair share of tax payable. To 
capture tax aggressiveness, we use an indicator variable that equals one if the country-
industry tax avoidance is within the top quartile of each country-industry combination, and 
                                                 
11 For instance, Citizens for Tax Justice reported in February 2012 on General Electric’s low tax rate of two 
percent over ten years. Despite this negative coverage, General Electric continues to be among the top tax 
avoiders in another study published in October 2015 (“The use of offshore tax havens by Fortune 500 
companies”). 
7 
 
zero otherwise. This measure attempts to capture the more aggressive tax-related activities 
that the media presumably are more interested in covering and thus is more closely related to 
our research question.12 
Based on logistic estimation, we find strong evidence that media independence is 
negatively associated with the likelihood of corporate tax aggressiveness. This effect is also 
economically significant. After controlling for home country tax system characteristics, a one 
standard deviation increase in media independence is associated with a 3.7% to 10.3% 
decrease in the likelihood of tax aggressiveness across various measures of media 
independence. This suggests that media independence plays an important role in mitigating 
the likelihood of tax aggressiveness, over and above the effects of formal institutions such as 
home country tax system characteristics (e.g., Atwood et al. 2012). 
In additional analyses, we explore whether legal institutions and information 
environment accentuate or attenuate the role of media independence in mitigating the 
likelihood of corporate tax aggressiveness. We find that the independent media play a 
smaller, more diminished role when the legal environment is stronger and when the 
information environment is more transparent. Finally, we find that the effect of media 
independence is accentuated when the expected reputational costs are higher, i.e., when the 
media audience is more educated. 
 Our study provides several important contributions to the literature. First, we 
contribute to the literature investigating cross-country determinants of tax aggressiveness. 
Atwood et al. (2012) find that tax avoidance across countries is associated with the strength 
of formal institutions, such as required book-tax conformity, worldwide versus territorial 
approach, and perceived strength of enforcement. We show that media independence also 
affects tax aggressiveness, after explicitly controlling for the tax system characteristics 
                                                 
12 Lanis and Richardson (2014) employ an alternate measure of tax avoidance based on firm tax disputes, in the 
U.S. This measure is difficult to implement, since our sample covers 32 countries.   
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studied in Atwood et al. (2012). We also document that media independence plays a more 
important monitoring role when the legal environment is weaker and when the information 
environment is less transparent. 
 Second, we contribute to the recent ethics literature that examines the effects of firm 
reputation on corporate tax avoidance and CSR activities. Hardeck and Hertl (2014) show, in 
an experimental study, that aggressive corporate tax strategies (CTSs) have a negative effect 
on corporate reputation and purchase intention, whereas responsible CTSs have a positive 
effect. We contribute to the literature on CTSs and corporate reputation by introducing the 
role of the media in the process. Additionally, recent literature has raised concerns about CSR 
practices of firms domiciled in tax havens (Preuss 2012). Our results highlight the potential 
for the independent media to expose such firms.    
 Third, we extend the emerging literature on the economic role of the independent 
media. This literature highlights the potential monitoring role of the media, which is 
frequently viewed as one of its most important functions (e.g., Djankov et al. 2003).13 For 
example, Brunetti and Weder (2003) find that a free press works to reduce overall country-
level corruption and, in the banking context, Houston et al. (2011) document that media 
independence is associated with lower corruption in bank lending. We contribute to this 
literature and the business ethics literature by documenting the effects of media independence 
in constraining corporate tax aggressiveness. 
 The rest of this paper is organized as follows. We discuss related research on the role 
of the independent media on firm behavior and develop our predictions on the effects of 
media independence on corporate tax aggressiveness in the next section. We present the 
measures of our primary variables of interest and our research design in section three, discuss 
                                                 
13 The importance of a private and competitive media is widely recognized; it is often called ‘‘the fourth estate,’’ 
along with the executive, the legislature, and the courts (Djankov et al. 2003). 
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the main results in section four, report the results of additional analyses and robustness 
checks in section five, and provide our conclusions in section six. 
 
2. Research Background and Hypotheses 
2.1 Role of the Independent Media in Firm Behavior 
In the context of corporate tax aggressiveness, our main focus is on the possible monitoring 
role of the independent media. The monitoring role of the media comprises two functions: 
dissemination of news the public should know, including information about corporate 
taxation and tax avoidance practices, and independent investigation of the actions of decision 
makers, including managers, external advisors, tax regulators, and governments. Another role 
of the media that is relevant for our research is agenda setting. As an agenda setter, the media 
inform both the public and governments about new developments at home and abroad, such 
as emerging strategies of tax evasion (Reuters 2012). Additionally, the media can keep the 
issues in the forefront by repeating the news with follow-up articles. Consistent with prior 
literature (Djankov et al. 2003; Gentzkow and Shapiro 2006; Houston et al. 2011), we 
measure media independence by the extent of private ownership and competition in the 
media industry, and rely on prior evidence showing that media independence enhances the 
agenda-setting and the monitoring roles of the media. 
 In general, an independent media, in its monitoring role, helps to enhance 
transparency, promote accountability of public officials, and reduce corruption (Brunetti and 
Weder 2003; Djankov et al. 2003; Leeson 2008; Coronel 2010; Houston et al. 2011; Chen et 
al. 2013). Brunetti and Weder (2003) find that a free press works to reduce overall country-
level corruption. Specifically in the banking context, Houston et al. (2011) document that 
media independence is associated with lower corruption in bank lending. Chen et al. (2013) 
examine the relation between media independence, as characterized by lower state ownership 
and competition, and audit quality. They document that auditors have a higher propensity to 
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issue modified opinions in countries with a more independent media. The findings of these 
studies highlight how media independence can increase transparency and shed more light on 
bank and audit practices. 
2.2 Media Independence and Corporate Tax Aggressiveness 
Building on prior research, we posit that media independence can play an important 
monitoring role in constraining corporate tax aggressiveness. Corporate tax aggressiveness is 
generally considered as exploiting the complexities, technicalities, and loopholes in the tax 
laws to maximize tax savings (Dowling 2014). Such behavior might involve risky and 
uncertain tax strategies (e.g., transfer pricing, offshore intellectual property havens) that 
sometimes stretch the limits of a legal interpretation of the tax law (Mehafdi 2000; Preuss 
2012). Although, tax aggressiveness could benefit shareholders and managers, it could also 
impose costs on other stakeholders, such as the government and society at-large. Alm and 
Torgler (2011) argue that an administrative compliance strategy should not only be based on 
enforcement but also emphasize such things as service and, especially, trust, because 
individuals, instead of only being selfish, rational, and self-interested, are also ethical. They 
state “a social norm can be distinguished by the feature that it is process-oriented, unlike the 
outcome-orientation of individual rationality.” The independent media can construct and 
perpetuate social norms and complying with such social norms is a kind of “process-
oriented” ethical behavior. 
Firms are likely to face trade-offs in their decision to engage in tax aggressive 
activities, which carry an uncertain outcome when challenged by the tax authorities. The 
direct benefit of tax planning is cash tax-savings, which can be utilized and redeployed to 
more productive uses such as funding investment opportunities or relieving financial 
constraints. The direct costs include tax planning costs, litigation and other expenses incurred 
in mounting a defense against tax authorities, back taxes, potentially hefty interest, penalties 
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and fines imposed by tax authorities, and more rigorous scrutiny from tax authorities in the 
long-run (e.g., being blacklisted by the tax authorities). Other costs include financial 
reporting costs, such as the costs of reporting lower book income, which is generally 
associated with the reporting of lower taxable income. There are also indirect costs associated 
with tax aggressive activities, including political costs, damage to the firm’s reputation, and 
agency costs. 
We predict that an independent media can constrain corporate tax aggressiveness by 
having an impact on both the expected direct and indirect costs of corporate tax 
aggressiveness. First, exposure of tax aggressive activities by the independent media can 
attract scrutiny from tax and regulatory authorities, which increases the probability of 
detection and enforcement, and opens the door for potentially large direct costs (such as 
litigation and other costs incurred in mounting a defense against tax authorities, back taxes, 
interests, fines and penalties).14 In the case of corporate tax payments, it is reasonable to 
assume that the tax payments of most firms are not widely known to the public (Dowling 
2014). Hanlon (2003) illustrates that it takes a tax expert to figure out what tax has been, and 
is likely to be, paid in any year of assessment.15 Therefore, the independent media serves an 
important role in investigating and exposing corporate tax aggressive practices, which 
increase the probability of detection and enforcement by tax authorities, and thus increase the 
expected cost of tax aggressiveness.16 Even if reporters are unable to unearth all the complex 
tax related transactions, Bednar (2012) and Bednar et al. (2013) document that articles with 
                                                 
14 Dyck et al. (2010, case summaries) highlight the case of Sprint Corporation, where an article by the New 
York Times alerted the IRS to the existence of four tax shelters promoted by Ernst and Young, and subsequent 
IRS investigations charged Sprint’s top executives with personal tax evasion via a mechanism that allowed them 
to cash out options without incurring tax liability for up to 30 years. This case illustrates that the media can 
conduct independent inquiry into tax avoidance activity. 
15 Many firms claim that they are transparent in their corporate values; however, Paine et al. (2005) document 
that most corporate codes of conduct rarely discuss tax obligations.  
16 As discussed in Dyck et al. (2010), even though journalists might be less specialized, they benefit from 
revealing complex issues, because high profile stories might help establish their career and reputation.  
12 
 
negative tone can influence corporate policies even if the coverage does not always highlight 
illegal acts. 
Moreover, negative media coverage can increase the cost of tax aggressive practices 
through heightened regulatory scrutiny or legislative action. Drucker (2010, 2011) points out 
that a year after publishing an in-depth article about Google’s profit shifting strategies, 
Google faced more than typical scrutiny from the IRS as well as from the French tax 
authorities. Additionally, Walgreens recently cancelled its planned inversion after facing 
extensive negative media coverage and public backlash (Kaufman 2014).  
In addition, independent media exposure of tax aggressive practices imposes costly 
reputational damage on the firm and its managers and thus deters corporate tax 
aggressiveness. There is some recent evidence of the negative reputational effect associated 
with tax aggressiveness. Bankman (2004) suggests that a firm that aggressively avoids taxes 
may be labeled a “poor corporate citizen,” which might adversely affect product market 
outcomes. Hanlon and Slemrod (2009) test the hypothesis that reputation matters, using both 
a sample of firms accused of tax sheltering as well as a sample of firms listed by the Citizens 
for Tax Justice as being poor corporate citizens for having low tax rates. They document 
some limited evidence consistent with reputational concerns being a viable disincentive for 
tax planning. Additionally, an experimental study by Hardeck and Hertl (2014) shows that 
aggressive CTSs have a negative effect on corporate reputation and purchase intention, 
whereas responsible CTSs have a positive effect. In our context, an independent media has 
the power to depict firms for the public and thus to affect their reputation (for better or 
worse). Therefore the media can be a mediator between CTSs and corporate reputation. For 
example, in the Starbucks case, although Starbucks had been successful in avoiding paying 
corporate taxes in the U.K. for several years, it became a political and social issue only after 
exposure by the media.  
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In addition, as noted earlier, Graham et al.’s (2014) survey-based results provide 
evidence that the potential for an adverse effect on company reputation significantly 
constrains firms’ incentives to engage in tax planning strategies. In their survey, concern 
about reputation ranks second only to the concern that a tax strategy might not pass the 
judicial standard of “business purpose/economic substance.” Graham et al. also document a 
positive association between reputational concerns and higher long-run cash effective tax 
rates and lower probabilities of engaging in tax shelters, indicating that reputational concerns 
are associated with lower tax avoidance. In summary, the media exposure of tax aggressive 
practices and the associated reputational costs can deter firms and managers from avoiding 
taxes.  
 Although we argued earlier that independent media exposure could deter corporate 
tax aggressiveness by increasing the expected costs of being tax aggressive, we note that the 
effectiveness of the media as a tool of corporate governance and, more specifically as a 
means of reducing tax aggressiveness, will depend on its ability and willingness to uncover 
and publicize corporate tax aggressive practices.17 Given that the media are themselves 
businesses, their decisions to publicize corporate tax aggressive practices will depend on 
whether the perceived benefits of doing so outweigh the costs. And, given that the print 
media derives most of its revenues from subscriptions and advertising, which depend on 
circulation and readership, and that the electronic media derives most of its revenues from 
advertising, which depends on viewer or listener ratings (Besley et al. 2002; Besley and Prat 
2006), the revenue generating ability of media firms is largely dependent on their ability to 
attract readers/viewers/listeners through content that is “newsworthy”. As evidenced by the 
many editorials and other articles on tax avoidance, whether firms pay their “fair share” of 
                                                 
17 The discussion in this and the following paragraph is largely based on Houston el al. (2011). 
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tax on their profits to the State or whether they engage in tax aggressive practices is clearly a 
newsworthy issue of ongoing public concern that has attracted much recent attention. 
Djankov et al. (2003) argue that stringent government control over the flow of 
information is detrimental to financial development in a country because government 
influence over the media can prevent the media from delivering complete and unbiased news. 
Consistent with this view, Houston et al. (2011) find that greater media freedom, as reflected 
by lower state ownership, is associated with less corruption in bank lending, presumably 
because effective and independent media perform a monitoring function. In addition, Kim et 
al. (2015) argue that “…. To implement distorted political objectives compromises the 
independence of state-owned media and renders it captive of the government. Thus, the 
watchdog function of the media to produce externally generated corporate transparency is 
weakened by the extent of state ownership.”  In our context, state owned media may have 
incentives to expose tax avoiders because such exposure benefits the state. On the other hand, 
state ownership also could lead to cronyism and politically selective targeting of firms or 
sectors instead of objective reporting of news.   
Competition among media firms also plays an important role in the effectiveness of 
the media’s monitoring effort and its ability to report independently. As noted by Djankov et 
al. (2003), “voters, consumers, and investors obtain, on average, unbiased and accurate 
information” when competition among media firms is high. In such a competitive 
environment, media firms have stronger incentives to identify and report on issues of interest 
to readers/viewers/listeners in order to differentiate themselves from their competitors, and 
thus to increase their revenues (Gentzkow and Shapiro 2006). Corporate tax aggressive 
practice is one such ‘‘newsworthy event’’ that media firms can use to achieve differentiation. 
By contrast, media firms in a less competitive environment (and more concentrated industry) 
have relatively weaker incentives to identify and report on issues of interest, such as 
15 
 
corporate tax aggressiveness, because the benefits of differentiation in such an environment 
are relatively lower.  
It follows that the extent of private ownership and competition among media firms 
correspond to greater media independence. That is, in these settings, the independent media 
have strong incentives to act as agenda-setters and corporate monitors to expose corporate tax 
aggressiveness. Based on this reasoning, we expect a negative relation between media 
independence and corporate tax aggressiveness. Therefore, we posit the following (in 
alternate form): 
H1: Media independence is negatively related to a firm’s corporate tax 
aggressiveness. 
  
On the other hand, Gallemore et al. (2014) find limited evidence that firms or their top 
executives engaging in tax sheltering activities face significant reputation costs, such as 
increased executive or auditor turnover. Also, despite negative media coverage of 
controversial tax practices, many large corporations continue to avoid taxes, which suggests 
that negative media coverage may have only limited influence on corporate tax 
aggressiveness. In other words, whether media independence is associated with lower 
corporate tax aggressiveness is not a forgone conclusion. Therefore our main objective in this 
study is to empirically examine the potential association between media independence and 
corporate tax aggressiveness. We believe that our empirical evidence can serve as a basis for 
future studies to develop more formal theory.   
Because corporate tax aggressiveness may be impacted by the institutional 
environment (Atwood et al. 2012), and media independence, as part of a country’s informal 
institutions, does not develop in a vacuum, we explore how media independence interacts 
with the legal institutions in influencing tax aggressiveness. We predict that the effect of an 
informal institution, such as the independent media, in constraining tax aggressiveness is 
lower when formal legal institutions are already strong. Prior work suggests that firms engage 
16 
 
less in tax avoidance when legal tradition and investor rights are perceived to be stronger 
(e.g., Atwood et al. 2012). When managers perceive that legal enforcement and investor 
protection are stronger, the higher expected probability of detection and potential for 
imposition of penalties may discourage tax aggressiveness. Therefore, the independent media 
is likely to play a smaller and more diminished role in an environment where firms are 
already paying their fair share of taxes due to better monitoring and enforcement. Based on 
this reasoning, we posit the following cross-sectional hypothesis (in alternate form): 
H2a: The negative relation between media independence and corporate tax 
aggressiveness is less pronounced when the country-level legal institutions are 
stronger. 
  
Next, we consider how media independence interacts with the information 
environment to influence tax aggressiveness. We predict that the effect of the independent 
media in constraining tax aggressiveness is lower when the information environment is more 
transparent. Prior work suggests that informal institutions, such as societal trust, are less 
positively related to investors’ reaction to corporate earnings announcements when country-
level disclosure requirements are more stringent (Pevzner et al. 2015). In a similar vein, we 
conjecture that when the information environment is more transparent, there is a lower 
demand for the independent media to perform investigative reporting to expose and uncover 
tax aggressive activities. Therefore, we expect the independent media to play a lesser role in 
constraining tax aggressiveness in more transparent information environments. Based on this 
reasoning, we posit the following cross-sectional hypothesis (in alternate form): 
H2b: The negative relation between media independence and corporate tax 
aggressiveness is less pronounced when the country-level information 
environment is more transparent. 
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3. Research Design 
3.1 Measure of Media Independence 
In our hypotheses development, we reason that an independent media, where journalists have 
incentives to investigate and uncover stories on wrongdoing, is better able to monitor 
corporate tax aggressiveness. Our first measure of media independence is based on the extent 
of private media ownership. Djankov et al. (2003) find that press and internet freedom are 
higher in countries with higher private (non-state) media ownership. Given this finding, we 
posit that private media ownership is more effective in monitoring. We measure the extent of 
private media ownership using the market share of viewership of private television stations 
(Private_TV).18 
 Our second measure of media independence is based on the extent of media industry 
competition. We posit that a competitive media industry is more effective in monitoring 
because media firms in a competitive environment have stronger incentives to identify and 
report on issues of interest such as corporate tax aggressiveness. We measure the extent of 
media competition using the aggregate market share of the non-top five largest television 
stations (Comp_TV) and daily newspapers (Comp_Press), respectively.19 We obtain the 
information on private media ownership and media industry competition from Djankov et al. 
(2003). These measures are compiled from various data sources on the ownership and market 
share of media firms from reports based in the year 2000. We explore alternative measures of 
media independence in additional robustness checks in section 5.4.  
 
 
                                                 
18 Djankov et al. (2003) also provide data for the market share of circulation of private newspapers. In our 
sample, all countries (except the Philippines) have a market share of 100%. We therefore do not use this 
variable because of its lack of variation.  
19 Industry competition is commonly measured based on the market concentration ratio. Following Houston et 
al. (2011), we define the media industry as less competitive if the aggregate market share of the top five largest 
television stations or daily newspapers is high. Conversely, we define the media industry as more competitive if 
the aggregate market share of the non-top five largest television stations or daily newspapers is high. 
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3.2 Measure of Tax Aggressiveness 
Following Atwood et al. (2012), we define tax avoidance broadly as the reduction in the 
explicit taxes paid. We measure tax avoidance as the difference between the tax on pre-tax 
income computed at the home-country statutory corporate tax rate and the taxes actually paid, 
expressed as a percentage of pre-tax income. In particular, our measure of tax avoidance 
(TAXAVOID) for firm i in year t is computed as follows: 
TAXAVOID୧୲ ൌ ሾ∑ ሺPTEBX ൈ τሻ୧୲ െ ∑ CTP୧୲ሿ
୲୲ିଶ୲୲ିଶ
∑ PTEBX୧୲୲୲ିଶ 																																																																						ሺ1ሻ 
where PTEBX refers to pre-tax earnings before exceptional items,  refers to home-country 
statutory corporate tax rate, and CTP refers to current taxes paid. We compute this measure 
using a three-year window because this time period is adequate to reduce the effects of items 
that reverse in just one year.20 Following Atwood et al. (2012), we require the denominator in 
(1) to be positive; hence, our sample only includes firms that are profitable in the three-year 
window. This measure of tax avoidance indicates the amount of taxes that the firm is able to 
avoid relative to the amount of taxes it is supposed to pay based on the home-country 
statutory tax rate (“unmanaged tax amount”), and the extent of tax avoidance is increasing in 
this measure. Because we intend to capture the more aggressive tax avoidance activities that 
the media presumably care more about in the course of their coverage, we use the indicator 
                                                 
20 We do not compute this measure over longer windows, such as five-year or ten-year windows (e.g., Dyreng et 
al. 2008), to avoid limiting our sample size. As noted by Dyreng et al. (2008), tax avoidance measures that are 
estimated over shorter periods of time may be imperfect because they include payments to (and refunds from) 
the tax authorities upon settling of tax disputes that arose years ago. Tax avoidance measures that are estimated 
over longer periods mitigate this concern because the income to which these taxes relate will more likely be 
included in the same ratio as the taxes. As a sensitivity check, we use a longer horizon of five years to compute 
tax avoidance, and find qualitatively unchanged results (untabulated). We also use two other alternate proxies of 
corporate tax avoidance. First, we compute tax avoidance based on the difference between the taxes on pre-tax 
income computed at the home-country statutory corporate tax rate and the tax expense recognized instead of the 
taxes actually paid. This measure is more closely related to the concept of GAAP effective tax rate, because it 
measures tax avoidance based on tax expense recognized in the financial statements rather than on cash tax 
actually paid. To capture the alternate measure of tax aggressiveness, we use an indicator variable that equals 
one if the country-industry tax avoidance based on tax expense recognized is within the top quartile, and zero 
otherwise (TAXAGGR_ALT). Second, we use the continuous measure of tax avoidance as the dependent 
variable. Our untabulated results are robust with these two alternate proxies of tax measures. 
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variable TAXAGGR, which equals one if TAXAVOID is in the top quartile in each country-
industry combination, and zero otherwise, to proxy for tax aggressiveness. 21  
3.3 Empirical Models – Main Analyses 
We estimate the following pooled cross-sectional logistic regression to test H1: 
TAXAGGRit = α + βMEDIAit + ψCONTROLSit + YEAR_FE + IND_FE + εit              (2) 
where TAXAGGR is an indicator variable that equals one if TAXAVOID is in the top quartile 
in each country-industry combination, and zero otherwise,  MEDIA is the measure of media 
independence (Private_TV, Comp_TV, or Comp_Press), CONTROLS is a vector of firm-level 
and country-level controls, and YEAR_FE and IND_FE are indicator variables for year and 
industry, respectively.22 Because we conduct our hypothesis testing on a pooled sample, we 
cluster the standard errors by firm (Petersen 2009). The Appendix includes the detailed 
definitions of all the variables. Based on H1, we expect higher media independence to be 
associated with lower likelihood of tax aggressiveness, and hence we expect β to be negative. 
We select CONTROLS that prior literature documents are associated with tax 
avoidance (Atwood et al. 2012). The first set of controls includes country-level variables 
(TAXRATE, WW, BTAXC, TAXENF, FACTOR, VARCOMP, EARNVOL, CULTURE, and 
GDP). We control for various characteristics of the country’s tax system such as: 1) statutory 
tax rate (TAXRATE);23 2) whether the country’s tax system follows a worldwide or territorial 
approach (WW); 3) required book-tax conformity (BTAXC); 4) strength of tax enforcement 
                                                 
21 Other measures of tax avoidance used in the extant literature include DTAX (Frank et al. 2009), tax shelter 
prediction score (Wilson 2009), unrecognized tax benefit (UTB) prediction score (Rego and Wilson 2012). 
However, because we use an international sample of firms from Compustat Global, many of the variables 
required to compute these measures of tax avoidance are either not available or not applicable in a setting 
outside the U.S. (e.g., tax shelter prediction score and UTB prediction score). 
22 Industries are defined following the classification in Frankel et al. (2002), which is based on the following 
SIC codes: agriculture (0100–0999), mining and construction (1000–1999, excluding 1300–1399), food (2000–
2111), textiles and printing/publishing (2200–2799), chemicals (2800–2824, 2840–2899), pharmaceuticals 
(2830–2836), extractive (2900–2999, 1300–1399), durable manufacturers (3000–3999, excluding 3570–3579 
and 3670–3679), transportation (4000–4899), utilities (4900–4999), retail (5000–5999), services (7000–8999, 
excluding 7370–7379) and computers (3570–3579, 3670–3679, 7370–7379). 
23 We control for the statutory tax rate to avoid the potential mechanical relation that may result from the tax 
avoidance measure computation including the statutory tax rate. 
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(TAXENF), and 5) institutional factor (FACTOR) because Atwood et al. (2012) find that these 
tax system and institutional characteristics are associated with firms’ incentives to avoid 
taxes.24 We include the country average of managers’ variable pay as a percentage of total 
compensation (VARCOMP) because prior literature suggests that managerial compensation 
incentives affect tax avoidance (Armstrong et al. 2012; Atwood et al. 2012; Rego and Wilson 
2012). We include earnings volatility (EARNVOL) as a control because Atwood et al. (2010) 
report that BTAXC is positively correlated with the cross-sectional variance in pre-tax 
income, and hence it is important to include this variable to ensure that the effect of BTAXC 
on tax avoidance is not overstated due to cross-country differences in earnings volatility. 
Finally, we control for culture (CULTURE) and economic development (GDP) which may 
influence tax evasion across countries (Richardson 2006, 2008), and a time trend variable 
(TREND) to capture the fact that statutory tax rates have been declining over time and may 
affect corporate tax aggressiveness over time. 
 The second set of controls includes firm-level variables that prior research documents 
are associated with tax avoidance. We control for firm performance using pre-tax return on 
assets (PROA) because profitable firms have greater incentives to avoid taxes. We control for 
firm size (SIZE) because larger firms have more resources and ability to avoid taxes. On the 
other hand, profitable and larger firms may refrain from paying lower taxes to mitigate 
additional political scrutiny on whether they are paying less than their fair share of taxes. We 
control for tax planning opportunities, such as research and development tax credits and 
interest deductibility on debt, using research and development intensity (R&D) and leverage 
(LEV). We control for sales growth (GROWTH) because firms with higher sales growth enjoy 
greater marginal benefits from tax planning, and hence have greater incentives to avoid taxes 
                                                 
24 We hand-collect each country’s annual statutory corporate tax rate and whether the tax system is worldwide 
or territorial from various sources, including Ernst and Young’s Worldwide Corporate Tax Guide, KPMG’s 
Corporate and Indirect Tax Rate Survey, PwC’s Worldwide Tax Summaries, PwC’s “Evolution of Territorial 
Tax Systems in the OECD” report. 
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(Goh et al. 2015). Lastly, we control for firms with multinational operations (MULTI) 
because operations in different countries present greater opportunities to avoid taxes through 
income shifting,25 and auditor quality (BIGN) which may affect corporate tax aggressiveness 
(Kanagaretnam et al. 2015). 
3.4 Empirical Models – Cross-sectional Analyses 
To test H2, we modify equation (2) to include the conditioning variable (Conditioning_VAR) 
and its interaction with MEDIA, and estimate the following pooled cross-sectional logistic 
regression:26,27 
TAXAGGRit = α + βMEDIA + + ηMEDIA × Conditioning_VAR + γConditioning_VAR  
      + ψCONTROLSit + YEAR_FE + IND_FE + εit                           (3) 
In H2a, we examine the moderating effect of legal institutions on the relation between 
media independence and the likelihood of corporate tax aggressiveness. Our measure of the 
strength of legal institutions (LEGAL) is the mean score of the three legal enforcement 
variables reported in La Porta et al. (1998). The detailed construction of LEGAL is outlined in 
the Appendix. We expect that the effect of an informal institution, such as the independent 
media, in constraining tax aggressiveness is lower when the formal legal institutions to deter 
                                                 
25 We use an indicator variable rather than the ratio of foreign pre-tax income to total pre-tax income to proxy 
for multinational operations because Compustat Global does not provide a breakdown of domestic and foreign 
pre-tax income for non-U.S. multinationals. We recognize that a firm’s inclination to be tax aggressive may be 
influenced not only by local media coverage of tax avoidance, but also by foreign media coverage. In an 
additional robustness test, we repeat our analyses after excluding multinational firms (i.e., MULTI = 1) from our 
sample and the un-tabulated results indicate that our inferences remain unchanged. 
26 Including higher order interaction terms in the model may cause the coefficient on the main effect of the 
conditioning variable to change sign unexpectedly, because the inclusion of MEDIA and its interaction with the 
conditioning factor can introduce multicollinearity among the interaction terms. To alleviate this concern, we 
mean-center MEDIA and the conditioning variables in our regression analyses (Aiken and West 1991; Neter et 
al. 1989). 
27 Ai and Norton (2003) argue that the interaction effect in a non-linear model, such as the logistic specification 
of equation (3), cannot be evaluated and interpreted simply by looking at the sign, magnitude, and statistical 
significance of the coefficient on the interaction term. Rather, interpreting the interaction effect requires 
computation of modified statistics based on cross-derivatives or cross-differences. However, Greene (2010) 
contends that the modified statistics proposed by Ai and Norton (2003) do not provide meaningful 
interpretations and statistical inferences. In addition, Kolasinski and Siegel (2010) draw on the extant statistics 
literature (e.g., Le 1998) and show that the interaction coefficient and test statistic in a standard logistic 
specification are appropriate for research dealing with non-extreme probabilities and are economically 
meaningful. Therefore, we continue to estimate and interpret the interaction effects in equation (3). 
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tax aggressiveness are already strong. Hence, based on H2a, we expect η to be positive in 
equation (3). 
In H2b, we examine the moderating effect of the information environment on the 
relation between media independence and the likelihood of corporate tax aggressiveness. 
Prior work suggests that institutional investors induce changes in the information 
environment and therefore firm transparency and information production are higher for firms 
with higher institutional ownership (Ajinkya et al. 2005; Boone and White 2015). Hence, we 
measure the transparency of the information environment as the average country-level total 
institutional ownership divided by market capitalization in 2007 (INFOENV), as reported in 
Ferreira et al. (2010). We expect the independent media to play a lesser role in exposing and 
constraining tax aggressiveness in a more transparent information environment, where the 
demand for investigative reporting is lower. Hence, based on H2b, we expect η to be positive 
in equation (3). 
 
4. Results 
4.1 Sample 
We collect financial information on tax aggressiveness, and other firm-level control variables 
for the period 1995–2007 from the Compustat Global database.28 Our initial list of countries 
is obtained from the 49 countries in La Porta et al. (1998). We identify 37 countries with 
these firm-level variables available. The country-level institutional variables are either hand-
collected (e.g., statutory tax rates, classification of worldwide or territorial tax system, etc.) or 
based on the data from related studies (e.g., La Porta et al. 1998; Djankov et al. 2003). We 
drop Hong Kong and Pakistan, because the information on country-level media and tax 
                                                 
28 Our sample period ends in 2007 because we obtain the requisite data from the Legacy Global Compustat 
database. The last year for which data are available in this database is 2007. The new Global Compustat 
database, which has the more recent data, does not include pre-tax exceptional items (data item 57 in the old 
database) and foreign income taxes (data item 51 in the old database).  Therefore, we are unable to compute the 
variable TAXAVOID, which requires data item 57 as an input and the variable BTAXC, which requires data item 
51 as an input, using the new Global Compustat database. 
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enforcement data is not available; and Argentina, Peru, and Venezuela, because each country 
has less than 100 firm-year observations.29 These sampling and data availability criteria result 
in a final sample that includes 32 countries. We also trim each continuous firm-level variable 
at the 1% and 99% level to mitigate the effects of extreme values. Depending on the 
availability of data, the final sample size used in the main regression analyses ranges from 
85,135 to 86,212 firm-year observations for the 13-year sample period. 
4.2 Descriptive Statistics 
Table 1 reports the sample composition and the median characteristics for each of the 32 
countries. The sample size for each country ranges widely from 137 firm-year observations 
for Israel to 27,304 firm-year observations for Japan.30 Our main test variable is media 
independence (Private_TV, Comp_TV, and Comp_Press). As observed from Table 1, 
Private_TV varies widely across countries. TV is fully owned by the private sector in Brazil, 
Mexico, Turkey, and U.S.A., and fully owned by the government in Singapore. The TV 
industry is most competitive in the U.S.A. and Japan, while it is least competitive in 
Australia, Korea, and Portugal. In the print industry, competition is the highest in the U.S.A. 
and India, and lowest in Denmark. 
Table 2 reports descriptive statistics and correlations of the regression variables for 
the sample. As observed from Table 2 Panel A, the mean (median) percentage of taxes 
avoided from pre-tax income (TAXAVOID) is 6.0% (6.5%), which, based on the mean 
(median) statutory corporate tax rate (TAXRATE) of 38.0% (40.0%), implies that the mean 
(median) firm in our sample paid a tax rate of 32.0% (33.5%). Table 2 Panels B and C reports 
Pearson correlations between the country-level and firm-level variables, respectively. The 
                                                 
29 Our results are robust when these three countries are included in the sample. 
30 In a robustness test, we employ weighted least squares to control for variation in sample country composition, 
and re-estimate our models by country-year, so that each country-year observation receives equal weight in the 
regression (see Section 5.5). 
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three proxies for media are positively correlated, suggesting that each proxy captures a 
certain aspect of media independence.  
4.3 Main Analyses – Test of H1 
In this section, we report our results for the test of H1, which examines the association 
between media independence and corporate tax aggressiveness. As shown in Table 3, all 
three measures of media independence are negatively and significantly associated with the 
likelihood of tax aggressiveness (z-statistic = -2.69, -5.60, and -2.40 for Private_TV, 
Comp_TV, and Comp_Press, respectively). The effect of media independence on tax 
aggressiveness is also economically significant. Specifically, a one standard deviation 
increase in private TV ownership (Private_TV), competitiveness in the TV industry 
(Comp_TV), and competitiveness in the press industry (Comp_Press) is associated with a 
3.72%, 10.34%, and 4.32% decrease in the likelihood of tax aggressiveness, respectively.  
The coefficients of the control variables are consistent with expectations. Similar to 
Atwood et al. (2012), we find that tax system characteristics, such as having a worldwide tax 
system (WW), higher required book-tax conformity (BTAXC), and greater perceived tax 
enforcement (TAXENF), are associated with lower likelihood of tax aggressiveness. We also 
find that in countries with higher statutory tax rates (TAXRATE) and in countries where 
managers have higher variable compensation (VARCOMP), firms are more likely to be tax 
aggressive, possibly due to the additional incentives to avoid taxes when statutory tax rates 
are higher and when managers have high-powered incentives. We also find that cultural 
factor (CULTURE) and economic development (GDP) positively associated with the 
likelihood of tax aggressiveness. Turning to the other firm-level control variables, we find 
that more profitable (PROA) and larger (SIZE) firms are less likely to be tax aggressive, 
possibly due to additional political scrutiny of such firms. We also find that firms with higher 
leverage (LEV) and sales growth (GROWTH) are more likely to be tax aggressive, consistent 
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with greater opportunities to avoid taxes for firms with more debt and greater marginal 
benefits of avoiding taxes for growth firms. Lastly, consistent with Atwood et al. (2012) and 
Kanagaretnam et al. (2015), we find that firms with multi-national operations (MULTI), and 
firms audited by Big N auditors (BIGN) are associated with a lower likelihood of tax 
aggressiveness. 
Overall, the results indicate that media independence is associated with lower tax 
aggressiveness, consistent with the independent media playing an important monitoring role 
over a firm’s tax aggressive activities. 
4.4 Cross-sectional Analyses – Tests of H2 
In this section, we explore cross-sectional variation in the relation between media 
independence and tax aggressiveness. In H2a, we examine the moderating role of legal 
institutions; we expect media independence to play a lesser role in countries where legal 
institutions are already strong and effective in deterring tax aggressiveness. The results of our 
tests are presented in Table 4, and are largely consistent with our prediction in H2a. 
Specifically, we find that in Column 1 and 2, the negative association between media 
independence and the likelihood of tax aggressiveness is attenuated in countries with stronger 
institutions, which is consistent with legal institutions and media independence acting as 
substitute mechanisms in constraining tax aggressive behavior. In addition, the coefficients of 
LEGAL in Columns 1 and 2 are significantly negative, indicating that the likelihood of tax 
aggressiveness is lower in countries with stronger legal institutions.  
In H2b, we examine the moderating role of the information environment; we expect 
media independence to play a smaller role in exposing and uncovering tax aggressive 
activities where the information environment is already transparent. The results of our tests 
are presented in Table 5. Consistent with H2b, we find that in all three columns, the negative 
association between media independence and the likelihood of tax aggressiveness is 
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attenuated in countries with a more transparent information environment. This finding is 
consistent with the independent media becoming less important in constraining tax 
aggressiveness when the general information environment is better, as it facilitates 
monitoring of tax avoidance by external parties. Also in all three columns, we find that the 
measure of information environment (INFOENV) is significantly negatively associated with 
the likelihood of tax aggressiveness, which suggests that having a better information 
environment curtails tax aggressive activities. 
Overall, the results in Tables 4 and 5 support our cross-sectional hypotheses and 
suggest that the independent media play a reduced role in deterring tax aggressiveness in 
jurisdictions where legal institutions are strong and the information environment is more 
transparent. 
 
5. Additional Analyses and Sensitivity Checks 
5.1 Instrumental Variables (2SLS) Approach 
We recognize that, like most studies of this type, our study may suffer from endogeneity-
related concerns such as omitted variable problems, because it is difficult to control for all 
possible variables that potentially affect media ownership patterns and media industry 
concentration in a country. These potentially omitted variables could also be related to a 
firm’s incentive and inclination to be tax aggressive in a given country, and thus our findings 
may be spurious. Our cross-sectional analyses mitigate this concern because it is arguably 
harder for an omitted correlated variable to explain both our main and our cross-sectional 
findings. Also, in all our cross-sectional analyses, we include additional controls for country-
level legal institutions and information environment, and thus it is more difficult to find an 
omitted latent institutional variable that explains both country-level media independence and 
tax aggressiveness in our analyses. In our study, endogeneity-related problems are also of less 
concern than they are in a pure cross-country analysis because we are examining the impact 
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of country-level media independence on firm-level likelihood of tax aggressiveness. It is 
unlikely that an individual firm’s inclination to be tax aggressive influences nationwide 
media independence. On the other hand, it is conceivable that high levels of corporate tax 
aggressiveness could generate calls for more independent media to uncover these activities 
(reverse causality). If this type of feedback effect were in force, the empirical relationship 
between media independence and the likelihood of tax aggressiveness should be positive. Our 
consistent finding of a negative and significant association between media independence and 
the likelihood of tax aggressiveness suggests that this type of feedback effect is unlikely to be 
a significant concern. Nonetheless, we attempt to address potential endogeneity concerns by 
employing a two-stage least squares instrumental variables (2SLS) approach. 
 Following prior research on the media (e.g., Brunetti and Weder 2003; Djankov et al. 
2003; Houston et al. 2011), we use the extent of democracy in a country as an instrument for 
media independence. Prior work has documented that democracy exerts a significant 
influence over media ownership pattern and competition. In particular, Djankov et al. (2003) 
examine various cross-country determinants of media ownership, such as the level of 
development, government ownership in other sectors, primary school enrollment, and 
autocracy, and find that autocracy is consistently and significantly associated with higher 
state ownership of the media. On the other hand, it is less likely for a country’s democracy to 
have a direct impact on a firm’s inclination to be tax aggressive. We proxy for the level of 
democracy in a country using the political rights index (Democracy) obtained from Freedom 
House, which is an index representing people’s ability to participate freely in the political 
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process, with higher values representing stronger political rights and hence a more 
democratic environment.31  
We report the results of the first-stage regression in Table 6, Columns 1 to 3. The 
coefficient on Democracy is positive and significant, consistent with our prediction that 
media independence is higher in more democratic countries.  The weak identification test 
suggests that the instrument is powerful, with the F statistic for the explanatory power of the 
instrument being highly significant at the 1% level in all model specifications, which suggests 
that the instrument is relevant.  
We then use the predicted value of MEDIA from the first-stage regression as our 
variable of interest in the second stage, and report the results in Table 6, Columns 4 to 6. The 
results show that the predicted value of MEDIA is significantly negatively associated with the 
likelihood of tax aggressiveness, which is consistent with the results reported in the main 
analyses. Overall, the results from the instrumental variables approach indicate that our main 
results still hold after controlling for potential endogeneity. 
5.2 Role of Media Audience Sophistication  
The reliance of the media audience on media reports on corporate tax aggressiveness and the 
ensuing reaction of the media audience likely vary with their level of sophistication and 
ability to understand and digest these reports. We expect a more sophisticated audience to be 
better able to assimilate and react to media reports on corporate tax aggressiveness. 
Furthermore, we expect managers to care more about their reputations among a sophisticated 
audience, who are likely to be their peers and important stakeholders. Therefore, the effect of 
media independence in constraining tax aggressiveness is likely to be more pronounced when 
the media audience is more sophisticated. We measure audience sophistication based on its 
                                                 
31 Our results are similar when we use an alternative proxy for democracy based on a democracy index obtained 
from the Polity IV dataset of Marshall and Jaggers (2007). This index is derived from coding the 
competitiveness of political participation, the openness and competitiveness of executive recruitment, and 
constraints on the executive, with higher values representing a more democratic environment. We do not include 
both proxies as instruments because both variables are very highly positively correlated ( = 0.83). 
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educational level (Education), and obtain the country average education level from responses 
to the World Values Surveys. We present the results of this analysis in Table 7. Consistent 
with our expectation, we find in Columns 1 and 2 that the interaction between Education and 
MEDIA is negative and significant, which suggests that the impact of media independence in 
deterring tax aggressiveness is accentuated in countries where the average education level is 
higher. 
5.3 Controlling for Accrual Components 
Next, we investigate the relation between media independence and the likelihood of tax 
aggressiveness after controlling for accruals. Miller (2006) finds that the press acts as a 
watchdog for corporate fraud by rebroadcasting information from other information 
intermediaries and by undertaking investigative reporting, and Dyck et al. (2010) document 
that the media plays an important role in detecting corporate fraud, especially for the biggest 
fraud cases. Both studies suggest that media independence could play an important role in 
deterring accruals earnings management. Therefore, the negative association between media 
independence and the likelihood of tax aggressiveness that we document could be due to the 
mechanical effect of accruals on the likelihood of tax aggressiveness (that is, media 
independence affects the likelihood of tax aggressiveness through accruals). 
We examine whether media independence affects the likelihood of tax aggressiveness 
solely through accruals or through other non-accrual-related tax-planning strategies, such as 
the use of tax havens, tax shelters, income shifting, cost sharing arrangements, etc. To do so, 
we decompose total accruals into three components, change in net current operating assets 
(WC), change in net non-current operating assets (NCO) and change in net financial assets 
(FIN) based on the reliability classification developed by Richardson et al. (2005) and used 
in Atwood et al. (2012). We include these three components in our main analyses in order to 
allow different types of accruals to differentially affect the likelihood of tax aggressiveness. 
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The untabulated results indicate that media independence is associated significantly with a 
lower likelihood of tax aggressiveness. This result indicates that the relation between media 
independence and the likelihood of tax aggressiveness that we document is not solely driven 
by accruals management, but also results from other tax planning strategies. 
5.4 Alternate Measures of Media Independence 
In this section, we test the robustness of our results by considering two alternate measures of 
media independence: media freedom of broadcast (Free_Broadcast) and print content 
(Free_Print), respectively. Both measures capture the extent of laws and regulations that 
influence broadcast and print content as well as the government’s inclination to use these 
laws to restrict the ability of media to operate. These measures are based on the Broadcast 
Freedom Index and the Print Freedom Index, respectively, from the Freedom House in the 
year 2000. Our untabulated results indicate that both measures of media independence are 
significantly negatively associated with the likelihood of tax aggressiveness, indicating that 
our inferences are robust to these alternate measures of media independence.  
5.5 Additional Robustness Checks 
We discuss several additional robustness checks in this sub-section. As highlighted earlier, a 
significant portion of our firm-year observations consists of firms from the U.S. and Japan. 
To mitigate the concern that our results are driven by observations from these two countries, 
we re-estimate our models using two different specifications. First, we employ a weighted 
least squares (WLS) approach to address the concern that large proportions of the sample 
(e.g., Japan and the U.S.) unduly influencing the empirical results and that each of the 32 
countries receives equal weight in the regression estimations (Dittmar et al. 2003).  Second, 
in a much more restrictive test, we repeat our analyses using country-year observations rather 
than firm-year observations. Under this approach, each country-year receives equal weight in 
the regression. The downside of this approach is that it substantially reduces the variation in 
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our sample.32 The results for the two alternative specifications are presented in Table 8. We 
continue to find a significant negative relation between media independence and tax 
aggressiveness in all columns (with the exception of Column 4, which is negative but 
insignificant). These analyses provide additional evidence that our results are not driven by 
over-representation from certain countries.33  
This study posits that an independent media might play a “monitoring role” in 
constraining corporate tax aggressiveness. In the main regression specifications, we control 
for Big N auditor which might act as an alternative monitoring mechanism.  However, there 
might be some other firm-level corporate governance mechanisms that are not controlled for 
in the earlier analyses. For example, Lanis and Richardson (2011) find that composition of 
board of directors affects corporate tax aggressiveness. However, data on firm-level corporate 
governance are not readily available. Instead, we rely on family ownership (FAMILY) and 
widely-held ownership (WIDELYHELD) at the country-level from La Porta et al. (1999) as 
alternative controls for governance.34 The untabulated results indicate that our main results 
are robust to controlling for ownership structure. 
 
6. Conclusion 
We study the effects of the independent media on corporate tax aggressiveness for a large 
sample of firms from 32 countries around the world. Because the exposure of tax 
aggressiveness by the media can potentially act as a deterrent for corporate tax aggressive 
behavior beyond legal institutions such as tax enforcement, we empirically examine the 
                                                 
32 In this test, we compute the average country-year tax aggressiveness based on the continuous measure of tax 
avoidance, TAXAVOID.  
33 We also conduct two additional robustness checks. First, we control for country-industry fixed effects in the 
regression. Second, we employ Fama-MacBeth (1973) estimation method based on yearly regression. Our 
untabulated results indicate that the coefficient on Comp_TV and Comp_Press is still negative and significant at 
the 1% level; however, Private_TV is now insignificant. Overall these additional tests suggest that media 
competition, rather than media ownership has a more pronounced effect on tax aggressiveness. 
34 We do not use these governance variables in our main regression because complete data is only available for 
24 countries. 
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relation between media independence and tax aggressiveness. We use the market share of 
viewership of private television stations, and the media competition among television stations 
and daily newspapers as proxies for media independence. We measure tax avoidance broadly 
as the difference between the tax on pre-tax income computed at the home-country statutory 
corporate tax rate and the taxes actually paid. To capture tax aggressiveness, we use an 
indicator variable that equals one if the country-industry tax avoidance is within the top 
quartile, and zero otherwise. This measure attempts to capture the more aggressive tax-related 
activities that journalists presumably are more interested about in their coverage and thus is 
more closely related to our research question. 
We find robust evidence consistent with our hypothesis that media independence is 
associated with lower likelihood of tax aggressiveness, even after controlling for legal 
institutions such as tax system characteristics that have been documented to be effective in 
constraining tax avoidance (Atwood et al. 2012). Our results are also economically 
significant. After controlling for home country tax system characteristics, a one standard 
deviation increase in media independence is associated with a lower likelihood of tax 
aggressiveness by between 3.7% and 10.3%, across the various measures of media 
independence. This suggests that media independence plays an important monitoring role in 
mitigating the likelihood of tax aggressiveness over and above legal institutions such as home 
country tax system characteristics. 
In additional analyses, we find that the effect of media independence on corporate tax 
aggressiveness is more pronounced when the legal environment is weaker and when the 
information environment is less transparent. We also find that the effect of media 
independence is accentuated when the expected reputational costs are higher, i.e., when the 
media audience is more educated. We subject our results to a number of robustness tests, 
including using an instrumental variables approach to mitigate endogeneity concerns, 
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controlling for accrual components to ensure that our results are not driven by the mechanical 
relation between accruals and the likelihood of tax aggressiveness, using two alternate 
measures of media independence, using two alternate measures of tax aggressiveness, and 
employing weighted least square regression estimates. Our inferences are robust to these 
additional tests. 
 Our study provides several important contributions to the literature. First, it 
contributes to the literature investigating cross-country determinants of tax aggressiveness. 
We show that media independence also affects tax aggressiveness, in addition to tax system 
characteristics. Second, our study contributes to the recent ethics literature that examines the 
effects of firm reputation on corporate tax avoidance and CSR activities by documenting the 
role of the media in the process. Third, our study extends the emerging literature on the 
economic role of the independent media. 
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APPENDIX: VARIABLES DEFINITION 
 
TAXAVOID = Measure of tax avoidance, defined as: 
ሾ∑ ሺܲܶܧܤܺ ൈ ߬ሻ௜௧ െ ∑ ܥܶ ௜ܲ௧ሿ௧௧ିଶ௧௧ିଶ
∑ ܲܶܧܤ ௜ܺ௧௧௧ିଶ  
where PTEBX is pre-tax earnings before exceptional items,  is 
home-country statutory corporate tax rate and CTP is current taxes 
paid. The extent of tax avoidance is increasing in this measure. 
TAXAGGR = An indicator variable that equals one if TAXAVOID (defined above) 
is within the top quartile in each country-industry combination, and 
zero otherwise. This variable captures tax aggressiveness. 
Private_TV = Private TV ownership (by market share), computed as one minus 
state ownership of TV. Data from Djankov et al. (2003). 
Comp_TV = Competitiveness in the TV industry, measured as one minus the 
aggregate market share of the five largest television stations. Data 
from Djankov et al. (2003). 
Comp_Press = Competitiveness in the press industry, measured as one minus the 
aggregate market share of the five largest daily newspapers. Data 
from Djankov et al. (2003). 
LEGAL = Law enforcement index, which is the mean score of the following 
three legal enforcement variables reported in La Porta et al. (1998): 
(1) the mean for 1980–1983 of a variable provided by Business 
International Corp., capturing the efficiency and integrity of the 
judicial system; (2) the mean for 1982–1995 of a rule of law 
variable obtained from International Country Risk; and (3) the 
mean for 1982–1995 of a corruption variable that assesses the 
corruption in government, obtained from International Country 
Risk. 
INFOENV = Average country-level total institutional ownership divided by 
market capitalization in 2007, as reported in Ferreira et al. (2010). 
TAXRATE = Country statutory tax rate. 
WW = An indicator that equals one if the home-country adopts a 
worldwide tax system, and zero if the home-country adopts a 
territorial tax system. 
BTAXC = Proxy for the level of required book-tax conformity, following 
Atwood et al. (2010). BTAXC is computed based on the conditional 
variance of current tax expense from the following model, 
estimated by country-year: 
ܥܶܧ௧ ൌ ߠ଴ ൅ ߠଵܲܶܤܫ௧ ൅ ߠଶܨ݋ݎܲܶܤܫ௧ ൅ ߠଷܦܫ ௧ܸ ൅ ݁௧  
where CTE is current tax expense, PTBI is pre-tax book income, 
ForPTBI is the estimated foreign pre-tax book income, DIV is total 
dividends, and all variables are scaled by average total assets. 
BTAXC is then computed as the scaled ranking of the root mean 
squared errors (RMSE) from these country-year regressions, and 
RMSEs are ranked in descending order so that higher values of 
BTAXC indicate higher required book-tax conformity. 
TAXENF = Proxy for the level of tax enforcement in the country, based on the 
1996 World Competitiveness Report. 
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VARCOMP = The sum of the value of option compensation and restricted stock 
compensation divided by total compensation at the country level, to 
proxy for CEO incentives. Data is from Bryan et al. (2010). 
EARNVOL = The scaled descending rank, between zero and one, of cross-
sectional pre-tax earnings volatility by country-year, following 
Atwood et al. (2012). Pre-tax earnings are defined as pre-tax 
income before exceptional items, divided by lagged total assets.  
FACTOR = The first principal component from the factor analysis of the 
country’s legal tradition (common law versus code law), strength of 
investor rights, and ownership concentration as developed by La 
Porta et al. (1998).  
CULTURE = Ethnolinguistic fractionalization index that measures the probability 
that two randomly selected individuals within a country belong to 
the same ethnic group. It is an index between 0 and 1, with higher 
values denoting lower fractionalization. Data from Mauro (1995) 
and used in Richardson (2006). 
GDP = Log of Real historical Gross Domestic Product per capita (in 
billions of 2005 dollars). Source: 
www.ers.usda.gov/datafiles/International_Macroeconomic_Data/...
Data  
TREND = Time trend variable, defined as the current fiscal year minus the 
first fiscal year in our sample (1995). 
PROA = Pre-tax return on assets is defined as pre-tax income before 
exceptional items, divided by lagged total assets. 
SIZE = Natural logarithm of total assets. 
R&D = Research and development expenditures divided by ending total 
assets. 
LEV = Total liabilities divided by ending total assets. 
GROWTH = One-year percentage change in sales. 
MULTI = An indicator variable that equals zero if foreign income taxes is 
missing or zero, and equals one otherwise. 
BIGN = Indicator variable that equals one if the firm’s auditor is a Big N 
auditor, and zero otherwise. 
Democracy = Political rights index published by the Freedom House. Higher 
ratings indicate countries that comes closer “to the ideals suggested 
by the checklist questions of: (1) free and fair election; (2) those 
elected rule; (3) there are competitive parties or other competitive 
political groupings; (4) the opposition has an important role and 
power; and (5) the entities have self-determination or an extremely 
high degree of autonomy.  
Education = This is a three level (upper, middle, and low) index relating to the 
highest education level attained, recoded and reported in WVS. We 
code the variable as 1 if the highest education level attained is 
upper or middle, and 0 otherwise, and use the average education 
level in each country to proxy for the general education level of the 
population.  
WC = Change in current operating assets minus current operating 
liabilities from year t-1 to year t, divided by total assets. 
NCO = Change in noncurrent operating assets minus noncurrent operating 
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liabilities from year t-1 to year t, divided by total assets. 
FIN = Change in financial assets minus financial liabilities from year t-1 
to year t, divided by total assets. 
Free_Broadcast = Broadcast freedom index, defined as one minus the Broadcast 
Freedom Index from Freedom House in the year 2000. The index 
ranges from 0 to 15, and measures the extent of laws and 
regulations that influence broadcast content. The greater the index, 
the higher is the broadcast freedom. 
Free_Print = Print freedom index, defined as one minus the Print Freedom Index 
from Freedom House in the year 2000. The index ranges from 0 to 
15, which measures the extent of laws and regulations that 
influence print content. The greater the index, the higher is the print 
freedom. 
TAXAGGR_ALT = Alternative measure of tax avoidance, defined as: 
ሾ∑ ሺܲܶܧܤܺ ൈ ߬ሻ௜௧ െ ∑ ܥܶܧ௜௧ሿ௧௧ିଶ௧௧ିଶ
∑ ܲܶܧܤ ௜ܺ௧௧௧ିଶ  
where PTEBX is pre-tax earnings before exceptional items,  is 
home-country statutory corporate tax rate and CTE is current tax 
expense. It is an indicator that equals one if the above measure is 
within the top quartile in each country-industry combination, and 
zero otherwise.  
FAMILY = Percent of firms controlled by the family shareholder in each 
country, where the cutoff used to define effective control is 10%. 
Data from La Porta et al. (1999). 
WIDELYHELD = Percent of firms without any effective controlling shareholders in 
each country, where the cutoff used to define effective control is 
10%. Data from La Porta et al. (1999). 
 
42 
 
 
TABLE 1 
Sample Composition and Median Characteristics by Country 
Country N TAXAVOID Private_TV Comp_TV Comp_Press LEGAL INFOENV TAXRATE WW BTAXC TAXENF 
Australia 3391 0.27 0.83 0.00 0.47 9.51 0.11 0.30 0 0.14 4.58 
Austria 540 0.13 0.22 0.24 0.26 9.36 0.18 0.34 0 0.79 3.60 
Belgium 630 0.11 0.59 0.43 0.35 9.44 0.13 0.40 0 0.63 2.27 
Brazil 264 0.09 1.00 0.04 0.76 6.13 0.33 0.34 1 0.48 2.14 
Chile 316 0.04 0.70 0.03 0.48 6.52 0.01 0.17 1 0.88 4.20 
Denmark 943 0.05 0.20 0.13 0.00 10.00 0.21 0.30 0 0.36 3.70 
Finland 816 0.01 0.52 0.05 0.55 10.00 0.47 0.28 0 0.43 3.53 
France 3853 0.08 0.57 0.08 0.73 8.68 0.27 0.34 0 0.48 3.86 
Germany 3643 0.18 0.39 0.30 0.32 9.05 0.24 0.38 0 0.12 3.41 
Greece 459 0.10 0.92 0.21 0.48 6.82 0.15 0.35 1 0.76 2.36 
India 1355 0.20 0.12 0.16 0.81 5.58 0.13 0.37 1 0.24 2.16 
Indonesia 809 0.10 0.77 0.04 0.54 2.88 - 0.30 1 0.33 2.53 
Ireland 394 0.11 0.32 0.43 0.05 8.36 0.32 0.20 1 0.69 3.55 
Israel 137 0.14 0.64 0.45 0.27 7.72 0.34 0.36 1 0.71 3.69 
Italy 1175 0.08 0.39 0.20 0.60 7.07 0.19 0.40 0 0.57 1.77 
Japan 27304 -0.02 0.61 0.51 0.61 9.17 0.08 0.42 1 0.62 4.41 
Korea, Rep. 1161 0.22 0.23 0.00 0.50 5.55 0.16 0.30 1 0.43 3.29 
Mexico 253 0.13 1.00 0.04 0.57 5.37 0.34 0.33 1 0.40 2.46 
Netherlands 1275 0.11 0.43 0.31 0.57 10.00 0.24 0.35 0 0.40 3.40 
New Zealand 498 0.12 0.29 0.08 0.39 10.00 0.12 0.33 0 0.50 5.00 
Norway 729 0.14 0.53 0.13 0.56 10.00 0.23 0.28 1 0.10 3.96 
Philippines 448 0.14 0.82 0.20 0.76 3.47 0.08 0.32 1 0.45 1.83 
Portugal 251 0.13 0.62 0.00 0.53 7.19 0.13 0.35 0 0.86 2.18 
Singapore 1786 0.04 0.00 0.10 0.07 8.93 0.12 0.22 0 0.64 5.05 
South Africa 657 0.27 0.10 0.01 0.38 6.45 0.17 0.38 1 0.17 2.40 
Spain 1001 0.16 0.57 0.20 0.66 7.14 0.16 0.35 0 0.74 1.91 
Sweden 1372 0.06 0.49 0.08 0.59 10.00 0.38 0.28 1 0.36 3.39 
Switzerland 1564 0.07 0.11 0.45 0.61 10.00 0.29 0.25 0 0.69 4.49 
Taiwan 411 0.17 0.37 0.03 0.22 7.37 0.15 0.25 1 0.90 3.25 
Turkey 268 0.21 1.00 0.26 0.47 4.79 - 0.33 1 0.45 2.07 
United Kingdom 8542 0.06 0.40 0.14 0.46 9.22 0.24 0.30 1 0.19 4.67 
United States 19967 0.10 1.00 0.65 0.89 9.54 0.75 0.40 1 0.02 4.47 
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TABLE 1 (continued) 
Country VARCOMP EARNVOL FACTOR CULTURE GDP PROA SIZE R&D LEV GROWTH MULTI BIGN 
Australia 0.31 0.22 1.39 0.11 10.42 0.09 4.77 0.00 0.19 0.09 0 0 
Austria 0.00 0.82 -0.78 0.03 10.48 0.05 5.86 0.00 0.24 0.04 0 0 
Belgium 0.00 0.60 -1.74 0.36 10.43 0.06 5.97 0.00 0.22 0.05 0 1 
Brazil 0.02 0.64 -0.68 0.06 8.58 0.09 7.21 0.00 0.25 0.10 0 1 
Chile 0.00 0.11 0.59 0.05 8.89 0.08 5.71 0.00 0.23 0.05 0 1 
Denmark 0.11 0.62 -0.53 0.03 10.73 0.07 5.60 0.00 0.25 0.06 0 1 
Finland 0.03 0.60 -0.04 0.11 10.45 0.08 6.03 0.00 0.22 0.04 0 1 
France 0.14 0.35 0.18 0.15 10.41 0.06 5.83 0.00 0.21 0.05 0 0 
Germany 0.05 0.40 -1.11 0.04 10.42 0.07 5.87 0.00 0.16 0.04 0 0 
Greece 0.00 0.69 -1.15 0.08 9.85 0.07 6.03 0.00 0.29 0.09 0 0 
India 0.14 0.16 1.41 0.74 6.43 0.12 5.55 0.00 0.20 0.12 0 0 
Indonesia 0.00 0.09 -1.02 0.69 7.10 0.08 4.31 0.00 0.24 0.08 0 0 
Ireland 0.11 0.45 1.21 0.09 10.66 0.09 6.03 0.00 0.27 0.12 1 1 
Israel 0.16 0.69 0.43 0.33 9.80 0.06 6.72 0.01 0.26 0.09 0 0 
Italy 0.05 0.71 -1.34 0.04 10.30 0.06 6.54 0.00 0.24 0.04 0 1 
Japan 0.02 0.15 0.78 0.01 10.36 0.04 5.67 0.00 0.18 0.03 0 0 
Korea, Rep. 0.00 0.07 -0.09 0.00 9.74 0.07 6.88 0.00 0.22 0.08 0 0 
Mexico 0.00 0.05 -1.49 0.17 8.87 0.10 7.35 0.00 0.23 0.09 0 1 
Netherlands 0.25 0.45 -0.33 0.06 10.50 0.08 6.43 0.00 0.22 0.06 0 1 
New Zealand 0.42 0.44 0.88 0.15 10.07 0.09 5.09 0.00 0.27 0.05 0 1 
Norway 0.00 0.38 0.39 0.07 11.03 0.08 5.78 0.00 0.26 0.09 0 1 
Philippines 0.00 0.53 -0.42 0.72 7.02 0.07 4.83 0.00 0.20 0.05 0 0 
Portugal 0.00 1.02 -0.59 0.00 9.70 0.05 6.71 0.00 0.35 0.06 0 0 
Singapore 0.13 0.38 0.83 0.32 10.15 0.07 4.66 0.00 0.15 0.07 0 1 
South Africa 0.31 0.51 0.28 0.83 8.45 0.16 5.63 0.00 0.12 0.14 0 0 
Spain 0.02 0.20 -0.04 0.27 10.11 0.07 6.55 0.00 0.22 0.08 0 1 
Sweden 0.09 0.45 0.09 0.07 10.52 0.09 5.86 0.00 0.19 0.08 0 1 
Switzerland 0.04 0.78 -0.71 0.31 10.78 0.07 6.22 0.00 0.22 0.04 0 1 
Taiwan 0.00 0.18 0.40 0.26 9.53 0.06 6.16 0.01 0.23 0.07 0 1 
Turkey 0.00 0.36 -0.93 0.16 8.33 0.11 6.37 0.00 0.16 0.26 0 1 
United Kingdom 0.20 0.20 2.03 0.11 10.44 0.09 5.39 0.00 0.17 0.07 1 1 
United States 0.40 0.22 2.10 0.21 10.59 0.10 6.55 0.00 0.21 0.09 1 1 
This table provides the sample composition and selected median characteristics by country. The detailed definitions of the variables are provided in the 
Appendix. All continuous variables are trimmed at the 1 and 99 percentiles. 
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TABLE 2 
Descriptive Statistics and Correlations 
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics 
Mean Median Q1 Q3 Std Dev
TAXAVOID 0.060 0.065 -0.037 0.196 0.228
TAXAGGR 0.249 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.433
Private_TV 0.626 0.610 0.400 0.830 0.267
Comp_TV 0.381 0.510 0.140 0.510 0.229
Comp_Press 0.616 0.610 0.470 0.760 0.203
LEGAL 8.971 9.167 9.167 9.543 1.171
INFOENV 0.297 0.228 0.080 0.377 0.260
TAXRATE 0.380 0.400 0.330 0.417 0.075
WW 0.762 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.426
BTAXC 0.363 0.357 0.095 0.619 0.269
TAXENF 4.125 4.410 3.860 4.470 0.729
VARCOMP 0.158 0.091 0.024 0.312 0.154
EARNVOL 0.269 0.218 0.127 0.327 0.197
FACTOR 0.923 0.784 0.386 2.034 1.029
CULTURE 0.131 0.106 0.010 0.209 0.154
GDP 10.280 10.422 10.351 10.514 0.705
PROA 0.216 0.070 0.033 0.127 2.321
SIZE 6.034 5.885 4.791 7.166 1.812
R&D 0.014 0.000 0.000 0.010 0.034
LEV 0.215 0.195 0.059 0.331 0.182
GROWTH 0.312 0.054 -0.013 0.160 3.096
MULTI 0.199 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.399
BIGN 0.444 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.497
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TABLE 2 (continued) 
Panel B: Pearson Correlation for country-level variables (N=32)
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14)
(1) Private_TV   1.00              
(2) Comp_TV   0.08 1.00             
(3) Comp_Press   0.46 0.05 1.00            
(4) LEGAL   -0.36 0.30 -0.26 1.00           
(5) INFOENV   0.29 0.38 0.27 0.29 1.00          
(6) TAXRATE   0.22 0.34 0.38 -0.03 0.12 1.00         
(7) WW   0.35 0.02 0.20 -0.51 0.13 -0.11 1.00        
(8) BTAXC   -0.07 0.02 -0.29 -0.09 -0.39 -0.27 -0.14 1.00       
(9) TAXENF   -0.30 0.16 -0.28 0.67 0.13 -0.38 -0.16 -0.13 1.00      
(10) VARCOMP   -0.15 0.13 0.02 0.38 0.28 0.17 -0.13 -0.47 0.48 1.00     
(11) EARNVOL   -0.15 0.14 -0.18 0.26 0.05 0.16 -0.43 0.33 -0.19 -0.11 1.00    
(12) FACTOR   -0.18 0.10 0.05 0.29 0.17 -0.23 0.25 -0.28 0.61 0.62 -0.41 1.00   
(13) CULTURE   -0.12 -0.03 0.16 -0.51 -0.13 0.11 0.25 -0.19 -0.33 0.13 -0.14 0.05 1.00  
(14) GDP   -0.22 0.30 -0.32 0.87 0.29 -0.05 -0.48 0.06 0.56 0.17 0.26 0.10 -0.71 1.00
Panel C: Pearson Correlation for firm-level variables (N=86,212)
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
(1) TAXAVOID 1.00
(2) TAXAGGR 0.58 1.00
(3) PROA 0.03 0.03 1.00
(4) SIZE 0.00 -0.04 0.02 1.00
(5) R&D 0.00 -0.01 0.01 0.00 1.00 
(6) LEV 0.02 0.08 0.00 0.23 -0.15 1.00
(7) GROWTH 0.04 0.05 0.84 0.04 0.00 0.03 1.00
(8) MULTI 0.03 -0.04 -0.01 0.20 0.25 -0.02 -0.02 1.00
(9) BIGN 0.10 -0.05 -0.02 0.20 0.12 0.04 -0.02 0.42 1.00
This table provides the descriptive statistics (Panel A) and Pearson correlations for country- and firm- level variables (Panel B, C respectively) of the main 
variables used in this study. The detailed definitions of the variables are provided in the Appendix. All continuous variables are trimmed at the 1 and 99 
percentiles. In Panel B, all correlations with absolute number greater than 0.51 are statistically significant at the 0.01 level or better (two-tailed). In Panel C, all 
correlations with absolute number greater than 0.01 are statistically significant at the 0.01 level or better (two-tailed).  
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TABLE 3 
Media Independence and Corporate Tax Aggressiveness 
  (1) (2) (3) 
Variables Private_TV Comp_TV Comp_Press 
MEDIA -0.202 -0.563 -0.235 
(-2.69)*** (-5.60)*** (-2.40)** 
TAXRATE 0.946 1.683 0.992 
(3.83)*** (5.95)*** (3.82)*** 
WW -0.174 -0.287 -0.158 
(-3.58)*** (-5.48)*** (-3.28)*** 
BTAXC -0.129 -0.064 -0.128 
(-1.89)* (-0.95) (-1.88)* 
TAXENF -0.079 -0.041 -0.086 
(-2.19)** (-1.13) (-2.32)** 
VARCOMP 0.753 0.663 0.576 
(3.19)*** (3.08)*** (2.65)*** 
EARNVOL 0.600 0.640 0.626 
(9.16)*** (9.70)*** (9.46)*** 
FACTOR -0.050 -0.035 -0.073 
(-1.42) (-1.01) (-1.99)** 
CULTURE 0.176 0.573 0.302 
(1.05) (3.46)*** (1.89)* 
GDP 0.137 0.226 0.144 
(3.54)*** (5.45)*** (3.74)*** 
TREND -0.001 0.001 -0.001 
(-0.18) (0.34) (-0.30) 
PROA -0.019 -0.019 -0.018 
(-2.62)*** (-2.59)*** (-2.58)*** 
SIZE -0.085 -0.083 -0.083 
(-9.84)*** (-9.60)*** (-9.53)*** 
R&D 0.490 0.612 0.490 
(1.22) (1.51) (1.21) 
LEV 1.290 1.301 1.286 
(17.62)*** (17.76)*** (17.56)*** 
GROWTH 0.043 0.043 0.043 
(7.28)*** (7.26)*** (7.26)*** 
MULTI -0.260 -0.264 -0.261 
(-6.18)*** (-6.30)*** (-6.22)*** 
BIGN -0.229 -0.213 -0.233 
(-6.31)*** (-5.91)*** (-6.45)*** 
Constant -2.518 -4.008 -2.579 
(-6.27)*** (-8.73)*** (-6.46)*** 
Observations 86,212 86,212 86,212 
Pseudo R2 0.0261 0.0267 0.0261 
This table reports the regression results of the relation between media independence (MEDIA) and tax 
aggressiveness (TAXAGGR). Column 1 shows the results when media independence is proxied by Private_TV; 
Column 2 shows the results when media independence is proxied by Comp_TV; and Column 3 shows the results 
when media independence is proxied by Comp_Press. The regressions include year and industry fixed effects. 
The detailed definitions of all variables are provided in the Appendix. Coefficients on the year, industry and 
country indicator variables are not tabulated for brevity. The z-statistics reported in parentheses are based on 
standard errors clustered by firm to control for cross-sectional dependence in the data. ***, **, and * denote 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
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TABLE 4 
Media Independence and Corporate Tax Aggressiveness – The Role of Legal Institutions 
  (1) (2) (3) 
Variables Private_TV Comp_TV Comp_Press 
MEDIA -0.509 -0.561 -0.259 
(-4.91)*** (-5.49)*** (-2.55)** 
MEDIA*LEGAL 0.214 0.173 0.052 
(4.27)*** (2.37)** (0.51) 
LEGAL -0.094 -0.046 -0.044 
(-3.35)*** (-1.71)* (-0.84) 
TAXRATE 1.736 1.825 1.177 
(5.86)*** (6.31)*** (4.26)*** 
WW -0.105 -0.241 -0.133 
(-2.04)** (-4.13)*** (-2.36)** 
BTAXC -0.189 -0.082 -0.152 
(-2.74)*** (-1.21) (-2.23)** 
TAXENF -0.119 -0.042 -0.048 
(-2.84)*** (-1.01) (-1.19) 
VARCOMP 0.969 0.509 0.577 
(3.96)*** (2.18)** (2.47)** 
EARNVOL 0.597 0.682 0.675 
(8.84)*** (10.14)*** (10.11)***
FACTOR -0.139 -0.066 -0.083 
(-3.58)*** (-1.67)* (-2.12)** 
CULTURE 0.223 0.541 0.367 
(1.32) (3.22)*** (2.16)** 
GDP 0.246 0.249 0.233 
(4.86)*** (4.75)*** (3.85)***
TREND 0.000 0.001 -0.003 
(0.01) (0.29) (-0.63) 
PROA -0.019 -0.019 -0.019 
(-2.61)*** (-2.63)*** (-2.61)*** 
SIZE -0.082 -0.084 -0.083 
(-9.39)*** (-9.67)*** (-9.52)*** 
R&D 0.586 0.604 0.517 
(1.45) (1.49) (1.28) 
LEV 1.294 1.298 1.285 
(17.65)*** (17.72)*** (17.55)*** 
GROWTH 0.043 0.043 0.043 
(7.20)*** (7.22)*** (7.22)*** 
MULTI -0.286 -0.264 -0.268 
(-6.74)*** (-6.29)*** (-6.35)*** 
BIGN -0.250 -0.214 -0.233 
(-6.83)*** (-5.94)*** (-6.47)*** 
Constant -4.004 -4.480 -3.883 
(-6.81)*** (-7.06)*** (-5.44)*** 
Observations 86,212 86,212 86,212 
Pseudo R2 0.0267 0.0268 0.0262 
This table reports the regression results of the role of legal enforcement (LEGAL) on the relation between media 
independence (MEDIA) and tax aggressiveness (TAXAGGR). Column 1 shows the results when media 
independence is proxied by Private_TV; Column 2 shows the results when media independence is proxied by 
Comp_TV; and Column 3 shows the results when media independence is proxied by Comp_Press. The 
regressions include year and industry fixed effects. The detailed definitions of all variables are provided in the 
Appendix. Coefficients on the year, industry and country indicator variables are not tabulated for brevity. The z-
statistics reported in parentheses are based on standard errors clustered by firm to control for cross-sectional 
dependence in the data. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
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TABLE 5 
Media Independence and Corporate Tax Aggressiveness – The Role of Information 
Environment 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Variables Private_TV Comp_TV Comp_Press 
MEDIA -0.492 -1.012 -0.614 
(-5.07)*** (-8.01)*** (-4.84)*** 
MEDIA*INFOENV 1.563 1.604 1.683 
(2.84)*** (2.49)** (2.43)** 
INFOENV -0.827 -0.761 -0.866 
(-4.24)*** (-5.02)*** (-4.64)*** 
TAXRATE 1.669 2.689 1.634 
(5.86)*** (8.11)*** (5.62)*** 
WW -0.106 -0.225 -0.055 
(-1.98)** (-4.25)*** (-1.00) 
BTAXC 0.005 0.073 0.008 
(0.07) (1.05) (0.12) 
TAXENF -0.065 -0.042 -0.056 
(-1.61) (-1.03) (-1.35) 
VARCOMP 0.583 0.677 0.181 
(2.19)** (1.94)* (0.65) 
EARNVOL 0.547 0.618 0.565 
(8.14)*** (9.19)*** (8.39)*** 
FACTOR -0.100 -0.074 -0.125 
(-2.60)*** (-1.96)** (-2.99)*** 
CULTURE 0.026 0.624 0.236 
(0.15) (3.62)*** (1.39) 
GDP 0.089 0.206 0.085 
(1.91)* (4.42)*** (1.84)* 
TREND 0.006 0.007 0.004 
(1.24) (1.66)* (0.96) 
PROA -0.019 -0.019 -0.019 
(-2.40)** (-2.39)** (-2.33)** 
SIZE -0.087 -0.087 -0.084 
(-9.87)*** (-9.85)*** (-9.50)*** 
R&D 0.413 0.519 0.402 
(1.02) (1.28) (0.99) 
LEV 1.278 1.286 1.270 
(17.22)*** (17.29)*** (17.11)*** 
GROWTH 0.044 0.044 0.043 
(6.74)*** (6.72)*** (6.74)*** 
MULTI -0.273 -0.273 -0.280 
(-6.46)*** (-6.50)*** (-6.60)*** 
BIGN -0.238 -0.245 -0.250 
(-6.30)*** (-6.59)*** (-6.61)***
Constant -2.416 -4.608 -2.360 
(-5.20)*** (-8.68)*** (-5.04)*** 
Observations 85,135 85,135 85,135 
Pseudo R2 0.0270 0.0280 0.0269 
This table reports the regression results of the role of information environment (INFOENV) on the relation 
between media independence (MEDIA) and tax aggressiveness (TAXAGGR). Column 1 shows the results when 
media independence is proxied by Private_TV; Column 2 shows the results when media independence is 
proxied by Comp_TV; and Column 3 shows the results when media independence is proxied by Comp_Press. 
The regressions include year and industry fixed effects. The detailed definitions of all variables are provided in 
the Appendix. Coefficients on the year, industry and country indicator variables are not tabulated for brevity. 
The z-statistics reported in parentheses are based on standard errors clustered by firm to control for cross-
sectional dependence in the data. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, 
respectively. 
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TABLE 6 
Media Independence and Tax Aggressiveness – Instrumental Variable (2SLS) Approach 
 
First-stage 
Dependent variable: 
MEDIA 
Second-stage 
Dependent variable: 
TAXAGGR 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Variables Private_TV Comp_TV Comp_Press Private_TV Comp_TV Comp_Press 
MEDIA -0.449 -0.550 -1.213 
(-5.03)*** (-5.27)*** (-3.88)*** 
Democracy 0.020 0.016 0.007
(12.85)*** (22.68)*** (5.85)*** 
TAXRATE 1.269 1.501 0.989 0.336 1.061 1.435 
(39.68)*** (56.11)*** (27.28)*** (3.30)*** (5.72)*** (4.07)***
WW -0.131 -0.270 -0.061 -0.040 -0.168 -0.093 
(-17.87)*** (-51.87)*** (-9.95)*** (-2.47)** (-6.08)*** (-5.18)*** 
BTAXC 0.042 0.183 0.086 -0.063 -0.057 -0.061
(4.04)*** (28.89)*** (10.61)*** (-4.39)*** (-2.74)*** (-2.21)** 
TAXENF -0.098 0.051 -0.103 -0.025 -0.009 -0.144 
(-18.54)*** (17.45)*** (-21.91)*** (-2.50)** (-1.23) (-4.07)*** 
VARCOMP 1.419 0.449 0.519 0.576 0.309 0.692 
(36.12)*** (23.32)*** (26.14)*** (4.23)*** (5.19)*** (4.21)*** 
EARNVOL -0.130 -0.028 -0.066 0.194 0.120 0.056 
(-15.48)*** (-5.75)*** (-11.11)*** (10.47)*** (10.30)*** (2.43)** 
FACTOR -0.010 0.056 -0.080 -0.016 -0.011 -0.117 
(-1.66)* (15.46)*** (-16.92)*** (-2.24)** (-1.44) (-3.89)*** 
CULTURE -0.420 0.633 0.237 0.215 0.375 0.314 
(-12.20)*** (27.68)*** (8.44)*** (4.55)*** (5.33)*** (4.10)*** 
GDP 0.049 0.150 0.049 0.014 0.119 0.096 
(6.37)*** (37.41)*** (11.69)*** (1.83)* (6.03)*** (5.02)*** 
TREND 0.007 0.007 0.004 -0.004 0.003 0.004 
(21.61)*** (29.47)*** (12.40)*** (-3.50)*** (2.96)*** (2.53)** 
PROA -0.000 0.000 0.002 -0.004 -0.004 -0.002 
(-0.56) (1.80)* (4.54)*** (-2.82)*** (-2.73)*** (-1.51) 
SIZE 0.000 0.004 0.010 -0.016 -0.014 -0.004 
(0.38) (6.20)*** (12.49)*** (-10.01)*** (-8.46)*** (-1.15) 
R&D 0.418 0.328 0.336 -0.100 0.268 0.496
(11.00)*** (10.92)*** (9.24)*** (-1.18) (3.22)*** (3.64)*** 
LEV 0.042 0.028 0.017 0.221 0.255 0.261 
(6.10)*** (5.94)*** (2.99)*** (14.88)*** (17.51)*** (15.77)***
GROWTH 0.001 -0.000 -0.001 0.009 0.009 0.008 
(1.75)* (-0.05) (-3.22)*** (7.85)*** (8.09)*** (7.20)*** 
MULTI -0.052 -0.024 -0.050 -0.020 -0.057 -0.105
(-15.50)*** (-7.96)*** (-15.22)*** (-2.31)** (-7.32)*** (-5.98)*** 
BIGN 0.019 0.037 0.006 -0.056 -0.027 -0.040 
(4.10)*** (12.32)*** (1.68)* (-7.73)*** (-3.65)*** (-5.18)*** 
Observations 86,212 86,212 86,212 86,212 86,212 86,212 
Adj. R2/Pseudo R2 0.616 0.724 0.570 -0.017 0.005 -0.111 
This table reports the regression results of the relation between media independence (MEDIA) and tax 
aggressiveness (TAXAGGR), based on an instrumental variable (2SLS) approach. In Columns (1) – (3), we 
report the results of the first-stage regression, where we regress MEDIA on the instrument, Democracy, and 
other control variables in the main regression. In Columns (4) – (6), we report the second-stage results using the 
predicted value of MEDIA from the first-stage. The detailed definitions of all variables are provided in the 
Appendix. Coefficients on the year and industry indicator variables are not tabulated for brevity. The t-statistics 
(Columns 1 to 3) and z-statistics (Columns 4 to 6) reported in parentheses are based on standard errors clustered 
by firm to control for cross-sectional dependence in the data. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, 
and 10% levels, respectively. 
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TABLE 7 
Media Independence and Tax Aggressiveness – The Role of Audience Sophistication  
  (1) (2) (3) 
Private_TV Comp_TV Comp_Press 
        
MEDIA -5.057 -4.637 -0.540 
(-4.05)*** (-4.66)*** (-0.53) 
MEDIA*Education -10.497 -8.968 0.607 
(-4.17)*** (-5.71)*** (0.27) 
Education -3.419 -4.255 -1.018 
(-5.89)*** (-7.05)*** (-2.50)** 
TAXRATE 3.958 5.763 3.229 
(7.44)*** (9.21)*** (6.59)***
WW -0.361 -0.152 -0.269 
(-2.70)*** (-1.10) (-2.15)** 
BTAXC -1.105 -1.069 -0.845 
(-8.17)*** (-7.60)*** (-6.25)*** 
TAXENF -0.596 -0.317 -0.006 
(-4.36)*** (-4.93)*** (-0.05) 
VARCOMP 2.334 1.382 0.968 
(2.46)** (2.27)** (1.82)* 
EARNVOL 0.275 0.235 0.219 
(2.63)*** (2.24)** (2.11)** 
FACTOR -0.095 -0.094 -0.111 
(-1.00) (-1.29) (-1.32) 
CULTURE 2.255 0.422 1.347 
(2.43)** (1.12) (3.37)*** 
GDP 0.190 0.048 0.147 
(1.80)* (0.65) (2.04)** 
TREND 0.005 0.019 0.012 
(0.85) (3.13)*** (1.96)**
PROA -0.009 -0.009 -0.008 
(-1.16) (-1.20) (-1.06) 
SIZE -0.062 -0.063 -0.060 
(-5.41)*** (-5.53)*** (-5.26)*** 
R&D 1.240 1.336 1.226 
(2.46)** (2.63)*** (2.44)** 
LEV 1.615 1.612 1.613 
(17.84)*** (17.79)*** (17.82)*** 
GROWTH 0.034 0.034 0.033 
(5.70)*** (5.66)*** (5.64)*** 
MULTI -0.111 -0.122 -0.109 
(-1.93)* (-2.12)** (-1.89)* 
BIGN -0.251 -0.289 -0.225 
(-3.85)*** (-4.42)*** (-3.49)*** 
Constant -4.381 -2.033 0.242 
(-3.42)*** (-2.69)*** (0.32) 
Observations 56,834 56,834 56,834 
Pseudo R2 0.0275 0.0281 0.0269 
This table reports the regression results of the role of education level (Education) on the relation between media 
independence (MEDIA) and tax aggressiveness (TAXAGGR). The regressions include year and industry fixed 
effects. The detailed definitions of all variables are provided in the Appendix. Coefficients on the year, industry 
and country indicator variables are not tabulated for brevity. The z-statistics reported in parentheses are based on 
standard errors clustered by firm to control for cross-sectional dependence in the data. ***, **, and * denote 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.  
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TABLE 8 
Controlling for Differential Country Representation in the Sample 
 Weighted least squares regression Country-year regressions 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Variables Private_TV Comp_TV Comp_Press Private_TV Comp_TV Comp_Press 
MEDIA -0.053 -0.074 -0.082 -0.023 -0.073 -0.082 
(-6.38)*** (-4.49)*** (-7.06)*** (-1.27) (-2.25)** (-3.43)*** 
TAXRATE -0.045 0.003 -0.000 -0.051 0.016 -0.007 
(-1.28) (0.07) (-0.01) (-0.65) (0.19) (-0.09) 
WW -0.028 -0.025 -0.012 -0.016 -0.018 -0.010 
(-3.98)*** (-3.58)*** (-1.74)* (-1.21) (-1.41) (-0.81) 
BTAXC -0.029 -0.021 -0.036 -0.066 -0.053 -0.073 
(-3.51)*** (-2.57)** (-4.37)*** (-3.78)*** (-2.96)*** (-4.22)*** 
TAXENF -0.039 -0.034 -0.040 -0.034 -0.030 -0.034 
(-9.89)*** (-8.66)*** (-10.07)*** (-4.25)*** (-3.84)*** (-4.49)*** 
VARCOMP 0.337 0.310 0.304 0.353 0.339 0.327 
(12.20)*** (11.20)*** (11.22)*** (6.42)*** (6.28)*** (6.09)*** 
EARNVOL -0.007 -0.000 -0.009 0.028 0.032 0.024 
(-0.79) (-0.04) (-0.94) (1.51) (1.70)* (1.30) 
FACTOR -0.008 -0.005 -0.001 -0.010 -0.013 0.001 
(-2.11)** (-1.24) (-0.33) (-1.33) (-1.61) (0.09) 
CULTURE 0.059 0.001 0.034 0.054 -0.019 -0.024 
(3.20)*** (0.05) (1.97)** (1.61) (-0.57) (-0.73)
GDP 0.010 0.001 0.011 -0.006 -0.000 -0.006 
(2.49)** (0.24) (2.73)*** (-0.67) (-0.03) (-0.68) 
TREND -0.005 -0.006 -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 -0.005
(-5.54)*** (-6.03)*** (-5.75)*** (-3.14)*** (-3.20)*** (-3.11)*** 
PROA -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.025 -0.024 -0.022 
(-2.12)** (-2.06)** (-1.99)** (-1.40) (-1.37) (-1.24)
SIZE -0.003 -0.002 -0.001 0.008 0.009 -0.017 
(-1.86)* (-1.60) (-0.93) (1.12) (1.37) (-2.41)** 
R&D -0.016 -0.014 -0.029 -0.984 -0.615 -1.036 
(-0.17) (-0.15) (-0.32) (-1.74)* (-1.04) (-1.88)* 
LEV 0.007 0.006 0.003 0.264 0.272 0.273 
(0.53) (0.42) (0.21) (2.61)*** (2.72)*** (2.75)*** 
GROWTH 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.031 0.030 0.028 
(3.35)*** (3.32)*** (3.20)*** (2.14)** (2.10)** (1.97)** 
MULTI -0.032 -0.030 -0.037 -0.010 0.017 -0.040 
(-4.54)*** (-4.04)*** (-5.14)*** (-0.27) (0.45) (-1.03) 
BIGN -0.039 -0.042 -0.042 -0.082 -0.083 -0.080 
(-7.23)*** (-7.92)*** (-7.96)*** (-5.20)*** (-5.36)*** (-5.18)*** 
Constant 0.408 0.237 0.425 0.387 0.275 0.353 
(7.71)*** (4.21)*** (8.23)*** (3.75)*** (2.53)** (3.52)*** 
Observations 86,212 86,212 86,212 342 342 342 
Pseudo R2/ Adj. R2 0.075 0.074 0.076 0.326 0.334 0.347 
This table reports the regression results of additional analysis that controls for differential country sample. 
Columns (1) to (3) show the results by employing the weighted least square estimation to control for different 
country size in the sample, where higher (lower) weights are given to countries with smaller (greater) sample 
size. Columns (4) to (6) show the regression results for country-year regressions, such that each country-year 
observation receives equal weight in the regression. The z-statistics (Columns 1 to 3) and t-statistics (Columns 4 
to 6) reported in parentheses are based on standard errors clustered by firm to control for cross-sectional 
dependence in the data. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
 
